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APPLICATION OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE TO
POSTPARTUM DISORDER-DRIVEN INFANTICIDE IN THE
UNITED STATES: A LOOK TOWARD THE ENACTMENT OF
AN INFANTICIDE ACT
APRIL J. WALKER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years, the phenomenon of mothers who kill
their children has occurred with great frequency across the United
States and abroad. This phenomenon is known as infanticide' or
filicide and has also been referred to as "suicide by proxy.",2 These
mothers are often suffering from postpartum disorders brought on by
hormonal changes associated with childbirth.3 Inevitably, they are
charged with murder in suits brought by state prosecutors. Due to
their mental illness, these mothers' legal defense is almost always
buttressed by a plea of insanity pursuant to the state's insanity defense
statues. Most insanity statutes require that an individual suffer from a
severe mental disease or defect and be unaware that her actions are
wrong. Whether a mother is unaware of her actions may be
determined by an analysis of whether the devil or God told her to
commit the act. If the devil told her to do it, she must have known the
act was wrong, while if God told her to do it, she must not have known
the act was wrong. Adding to the difficulty of determining a mother's
mental state is the fact that the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
(DSM-IV) does not recognize postpartum disorders as a distinct,
separate category of mental illness.4 Therefore, it is difficult for a
court to find that postpartum disorder qualifies as a severe mental
illness.
On June 20, 2001, 5 the country was shocked by the news that a
mother in Houston, Texas, Andrea Pia Yates, drowned her five
* Assistant Professor, Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Texas Southern University.
Professor Walker is also an associate judge with the City of Houston Municipal Court System.
1. See Mark Levy, Moms Who Kill: When Depression Turns Deadly, PSYCHOL. TODAY,
Nov-Dec. 2002, at 60, 62.
2. Id. at 62.
3. Id. at 64.
4. See DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 386 (4th ed.,
1994).
5. See Yates v. Texas, 171 S.W.3d 215, 218 (Tx. Ct. App. 2005).
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children in the bathtub.6 Since that time, there have been similar
occurrences: Dena Schlosser cut off the arms of her eleven-month old
child in Piano, Texas,7 and Deanna Laney stoned her two sons to death
in Tyler, Texas. 8  Most remember Susan Smith, the South Carolina
mother who drowned her children by driving her automobile into a
lake. 9  Most recently, on October 19, 2005, Lashaun Harris of
Oakland, California drowned her three children when she threw them
into the San Francisco Bay. 10 The question becomes: do these
individuals have the requisite culpable mental state to satisfy the
elements of murder? It seems almost certain that they are insane, but
can society allow them to be acquitted for killing their own children?
Additionally, do current state insanity statutes provide a proper
defense for such individuals?
This article will deal specifically with mothers who kill their
children within twelve months of giving birth as a result of their
postpartum disorders. While other countries have standardized statutes
to deal with this particularized subset of killings,1' there is no such
standardized treatment or statute to guide American judges and
juries. 12 This has led to very inconsistent legal results in the various
cases. 13 In Texas, Andrea Yates did not prevail in her effort to plead
insanity, 14 although the Texas Court of Appeals has since granted her a
new trial for other reasons. 15 On the other hand, a Texas jury found
Deanna Laney not guilty of capital murder by reason of insanity.' 
6
6. Lisa Teachey, Yates' Lawyers Plan to Enter Insanity Plea, Hous. CHRON., July 31,
2001, at IA.
7. Texas Mother Who Killed Baby Is Acquitted on Insanity Grounds, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
8, 2006, at A11.
8. Mother Is Held In Sons' Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2003, at A25.
9. Rick Bragg, Mother in South Carolina Guilty of Murder in Drowning of 2 Sons,
N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1995, at 1.1.
10. Lee Romney & Monte Morin, San Francisco Reeling as Search for 2 Boys Goes On,
L.A. TIMES, at Al, Oct. 21, 2005.
11. CHERYL L. MEYER ET AL., MOTHERS WHO KILL THEIR CHILDREN 171-72 (2001)
(noting that England enacted the British Infanticide Act, which applies in cases where women
kill their children within the first twelve months of life).
12. Id. at 172 (stating that because there are no federal or state statutes that govern
infanticide in the United States, disparate sentencing occurs as a result of the predilections of
local prosecutors, judges and jurors).
13. Id.
14. Levy, supra note 1, at 60 (pointing out that although Andrea Yates was "diagnosed
with postpartum psychosis, she was judged capable of discerning right from wrong and
sentenced to life in prison").
15. See Yates v. Texas, 171 S.w.3d 215, 220 (Tx. Ct. App. 2005) (reversing trial court's
denial of Yates's Motion for Mistrial).
16. See Mom Who Said She Killed on God's Orders Acquitted, CNN.COM, Apr. 6, 2004,
http://www.cnn.comi/2004/LAW/04/03/childrenslain/.
[VOL. 6:197
THE INSANITY DEFENSE AND INFANTICIDE
This article will also address the viability of the insanity
defense when applied to the phenomenon of infanticide, and
specifically examine postpartum disorder-driven infanticide. This
article will explore the similarities of the circumstances of Yates,
Laney, and others, the differences in the legal outcomes, and the
reasons why the legal outcomes were different. Finally, this article
will also compare the insanity defense statutes and trends of other
countries against individual American states in an effort to predict
whether change may be on the horizon for the insanity defense statutes
and whether it matters.
II. WHAT IS POSTPARTUM DISORDER-DRIVEN INFANTICIDE?
As stated above, infanticide is also referred to as filicide and
sometimes "suicide by proxy."' 7 Infanticide is defined as the act of a
parent killing his or her child.'8  While infanticide has occurred all
over the world, statistics indicate that the United States ranks high on
the list of countries whose inhabitants kill their children.' 9 Statistics
compiled by the U.S. Bureau of Statistics also indicate that "[a] parent
is the perpetrator in most homicides of children under age five." 20 It
is, therefore, ironic that the United States does not have an infanticide
act.
Infanticide resulting from mental illness is one of many
categories of infanticide. 21 Infanticide resulting from mental illness
17. See Levy, supra note 1, at 62. See also Mike Tolson, Parents Who Kill Vary in
Motives, Researchers Say, Hous. CHRON., June 22, 2001, at Al (in which Forensic
psychologist George Rekers suggests that "suicide by proxy" occurs when the parent, usually
a mother, has lost touch with reality to such a degree that she is no longer clear about her
identity-in their confused state, they are thinking of suicide and end up killing their children
instead).
18. Wikipedia, Infanticide, http://www.reference.com/browse/wiki/filicide (last visited
Nov. 27, 2005).
19. True Crimes and Justice, Infanticide, http://www.karisable.comlcrinfant.htm (last
visited Nov. 26, 2005). See also Tolson, supra note 17 (noting that within the country's
annual homicide statistics there is a category of child-killings by parents).
20. See James Alan Fox & Marianne W. Zawitz, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Homicide Trends
in the U.S (2003), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/children.htm (noting that of all
children under age 5 murdered from 1976-2004, 31% were killed by fathers, 30% were killed
by mothers, 23% were killed by male acquaintances, 7% were killed by other relatives and 3%
were killed by strangers).
21. See MEYER, supra note 11, at 169-70 (opining that there are five categories of
infanticide: (1) neonaticide; (2) assisted-coerced killings of children; (3) neglect-related cases;
(4) those resulting from mental illness; and (5) abuse-related infanticide). See also Tolson,
supra note 17 (noting that experts say filicide falls within one of five categories: accidental,
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frequently occurs as a result of temporary illness, and it is also
committed by mothers who suffer from more severe forms of chronic
sustained mental illness. 22 It is believed that fifty to eighty percent of
women experience some level of emotional depression after childbirth,
which is also known as the "baby blues."
23
There are at least three known postpartum mood disorders:
postpartum "blues," postpartum depression and postpartum
psychosis. 24 Postpartum depression is also referred to as PPD and is a
mood disorder that has characteristics similar to those of clinical
depression. 25 On the other hand, postpartum psychosis is rare and is
the most severe form of postpartum disorders.26 Andrea Yates had a
long history of mental illness and was diagnosed with postpartum
psychosis. 27 One of the most predominant symptoms of postpartum
psychosis is a break with reality-an inability to recognize the
difference between what is real and what is not. While mothers with
PPD may exhibit violent thoughts about her child, they have the ability
to recognize that such thoughts are wrong, and as such, may not act on
29them.
Infanticide caused by mental illness is thought to be a rare
phenomenon and statistics indicate that only "four percent of women
who become psychotic kill their babies.' 30 Researchers have not yet
determined the cause of postpartum mood disorders, however, one
theory suggests that a sharp drop in estrogen and progesterone
following childbirth is the cause. 31 Other researchers have theorized
that certain thyroid antibodies produced in some women during
altruistic, acutely psychotic, unwanted child or spouse revenge). Accidental, the most
common, occurs when physical punishment goes too far. It can include shaken baby
syndrome or Munchausen Syndrome by proxy, a mental illness in which the mother causes
injury to the child then seeks medical treatment. Id. Unwanted-child deaths occur when a
parent discards a baby shortly after birth. Id. Revenge or retaliation killings result when a
plan to inflict pain on a spouse or former spouse includes using the child as a means to that
end. Id. Acutely psychotic cases usually result from serious mental illness when the parent
may have delusions that the child is a threat. Id. Altruistic filicide involves mothers who are
depressed, often suicidal, and sometimes psychotic. They believe they are doing the best for
their children by killing them. Id.
22. See MEYER, supra note 11, at 170.
23. Levy, supra note 1, at 60, 62.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 62.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 60.
28. Id.
29. Levy, supra note 1, at 62.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 64.
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pregnancy were three times more likely to experience depression after
childbirth.32
III. OVERVIEW AND HISTORY OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE IN THE
UNITED STATES
The roots of the insanity defense find its origins in England,
when, in 1843, Daniel M'Naghten raised the defense after he killed the
secretary of Prime Minister Peel of the Tory Party during a
schizophrenic episode. M'Naghten was acquitted of responsibility
for the killing at trial and, on appeal, the House of Lords devised the
M'Naghten test.34 The first part of the test excuses an accused party
from a crime committed while under a "defect in reason" that
prevented the accused from knowing "the nature and qualify of the act
[s]he was doing." 35 The second part of the test excuses the accused
even if she does know the nature and quality of the act, as long as she
"did not know" that what she was doing was wrong. The third part
of the test provides that individuals with "partial delusion[s]" should
be placed "in the same [category of responsibility] as if the facts, in
respect to which the delusion exists, were real.",37 As such, if a person
kills another because he delusionally believes the victim was about to
kill him, he would be excused because killing to defend oneself against
deadly force is justifiable. 38
In the Model Penal Code, the American Law Institute (ALL)
adopted a test, which provides that "a person is not responsible for
criminal conduct if at the time of the conduct as a result of mental
disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the
criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to
the requirements of law." 39 The ALI test provided an excuse for
individuals who are unable to "appreciate" that a criminal act was
wrong. The ALI test was adopted by over half the states in the United
32. Id.
33. M'Naghten's Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.).
34. Id. at 720.
35. Id. at 722.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 719.
38. Id. at 723.
39. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1962) (emphasis added).
2006]
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40States. 4  Some states identify this test as a "diminished capacity"
defense.4 1 The ALI test was abolished by many states in response to
the outrage resulting from the acquittal of John Hinckley, Jr. in 1982.
After the acquittal of John Hinckley, Jr. in 1982, the federal
test for insanity was adopted in 1984.42 The federal test provides that
"[i]t is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any Federal
statute that, at the time of the commission of the acts constituting the
offense, the defendant, as a result of severe mental disease or defect,
was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of
his acts."43 Although the federal test is not as rigid as the M'Naghten
test, because the federal test requires only that the individual fail to
appreciate that a criminal act is wrong, while the M'Naghten test
requires that the individual fail to have knowledge that the criminal act
is wrong, the federal test is more rigid than the ALI test because it
requires a severe mental disease or defect.
In the mid-nineteenth century, a few jurisdictions also adopted
the "irresistible impulse test" (11T). 44 The IIT states that a person is
insane if, at the time of the offense: (1) she acted from an irresistible
and uncontrollable impulse; (2) she lost the power to choose between
right and wrong; and (3) she lacked the will to control her actions.45
The IIT adds a third prong to the M'Naghten test by adding the
requirement of volitional capacity.46 As such, the IIT requires that the
individual was infirmed with a mental disease, impeding the individual
47from controlling her actions. The IIT faced many of the same
criticisms of the M'Naghten test, and it was never favored enough to
be adopted by a majority of states.48
Eleven states have adopted the Guilty But Mentally Ill (GBMI)
standard-Alaska, Delaware, as an additional option for individuals at
the time of trial.49 The judge or jury may find that the individual's
mental illness was not serious enough to justify an acquittal, but still
40. MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 162 (1st ed.
1989).
41. See infra note 200 and accompanying text.
42. 18 U.S.C. § 17 (1984).
43. Id. at (a).
44. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 321 (New York: Lexis, 2d ed.
1995).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 321-23.
47. Id.
48. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScOr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 320 (2d ed. 1986).
49. DRESSLER, supra note 44, at 321.
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warrants a need for treatment. 50  The GBMI requires that the
individual is found mentally ill, but not legally insane, at the time of
the offense. 5 1 When an individual receives a verdict of GBMI, she is
found guilty of the offense, receives a penal sentence, and may receive
treatment for her mental illness.
52
Many jurisdictions still follow some variation of the
M'Naghten test and the federal test. As stated above, the federal test
requires that the mother possess more than a mere mental disease-it
must be a "severe" mental disease. This result has led to varying
degrees of treatment of the specific case of mothers who kill their
young children as a result of postpartum disorders. Postpartum
disorders have barely received recognition as mental disorders, let
alone as "severe" mental disorders. Even the most severe form of
postpartum disorders-postpartum psychosis-has not been formally
recognized by the psychiatric/psychological community, or the
criminal justice system as a severe mental disorder. As such, many
mothers who have killed their young children as a result of postpartum
psychosis are not successful in their insanity pleas and are found guilty
of murder or capital murder.Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan,
Mississippi, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, South Carolina and South
Dakota. T GBMI is not a replacement for the insanity plea but serves
IV. THE PROBLEM: IN ITS PRESENT FORM, DOES THE INSANITY PLEA IN
THE UNITED STATES PROVIDE A VIABLE DEFENSE FOR
MOTHERS WHO COMMIT INFANTICIDE?
A. Treatment of the Crime of Infanticide Committed by
Mothers in Other Countries
1. The British Infanticide Act
Many countries recognize the circumstances resulting in
infanticide and have enacted laws that provide leniency for mothers
who kill their children within close proximity (twelve months or so) to
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.030-12.47.050 (Michie 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §
401(b) (1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(b)(1)(D) (1992); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-2(c)
(1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-2-3(4) (West 1986); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-13-9 (1972);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-3 (Michie 1978); 18 PA. STAT. ANN. § 314 (West 1983); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 17-24-20 (Law. Co-op. 1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-7-2 (Michie 1985).
2006]
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giving birth.54 Most notable is the British Infanticide Act, which
applies to all women who kill their children within the first twelve
months of life. The British Infanticide Act states the following:
Where a woman by any willful act or omission causes
the death of her child under the age of twelve months,
but at the time of the act or omission the balance of her
mind was disturbed by reason of her not fully recovered
from the effect of giving birth to the child or by reason
of the effect of lactation consequent upon the birth of
the child, she is by statute guilty of the offence of
infanticide even though but for the statute the offence
would have been murder. The punishment is as if the
woman had been guilty of manslaughter of the child.56
The British Infanticide Act was enacted in 1922 and was
amended in 1938.5v Since that time the imposition of prison sentences
against such individuals have been virtually abandoned as a method of
punishment.58 The British Infanticide Act takes into consideration the
imbalances that occur within women as a result of giving birth. 59 The
Act creates a legal presumption that women who kill their children
within the first twelve months of life are ill.
There is no such federal or state statute in the United States,
and, therefore, no consistency for the treatment of individuals like
Andrea Yates.60 Due to a lack of research in the area of postpartum
disorders, the insanity defense, in its current form in many states, is
akin to fitting a square peg in a round hole; unable to provide a viable
defense for mothers who commit this specialized subset of killings.
6 1
54. See MEYER, supra note 11, at 171.
55. See Infanticide Act of 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, c. 36, § 1(1) (Eng.).
56. Id.
57. Id. (the 1922 act refers to "newborns" while the 1938 Amendment refers to children
under the age of twelve months).
58. See MEYER, supra note 11, at 171 (citing 1 NIGEL WALKER, CRIME AND INSANITY IN
ENGLAND 133 (Edinburgh University Press 1973)).
59. See id.
60. See id. See also MARGARET G. SPINELLI, INFANTICIDE: PSYCHOSOCIAL AND LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES ON MOTHERS WHO KILL (2003).
61. See MEYER, supra note 11, at 172 (noting that a mother's defense lawyer failed to
raise the issue of postpartum psychosis at trial because there was very little research to support
the phenomenon).
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2. The Canadian Infanticide Act
Canada also has an Infanticide Act. The Canadian Infanticide
Act reads as follows:
A female person commits infanticide when by a willful
act or omission she causes the death of her newly-born
child, if at the time of the act or omission she is not
fully recovered from the effects of giving birth to the
child and by reason thereof or of the effect of lactation
consequent on the birth of the child her mind is then
disturbed.62
63
The Canadian Act, enacted in 1948, was based on the British
Act.64 Since its enactment, no mother who has killed her own child of
less than twelve months has been sentenced to imprisonment for
longer than five years.65 The Canadian Infanticide Act was most
recently applied in the case of Her Majesty the Queen v. Krystal Ann
Coombs.
6
Krystal Ann Coombs killed her baby Hazel Ann by strong
shaking and the application of blunt trauma to Hazel Ann's head.6
68Hazel Ann was ten weeks old. 8 The Court pointed out that the
maximum sentence for the crime of infanticide was five years. 6' The
Court also noted that infanticide constitutes a lesser offense and is an
included offense in the offense of murder.70 In Canada, it is a
requirement that there be a link between the mental disturbance and
the birth of the child or lactation.7' It is not required, however, that the
act itself be caused by the mental disturbance-only that the mother's
mind is disturbed at the time of the act. 72 In fact, it is implied that if a
mother with a disturbed mind kills her child, the disturbance caused
the killing.73 Furthermore, the degree of mental disturbance is not
defined by the Canadian Infanticide Act and does not require an actual
62. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 233 (Canada).
63. The Queen v. Krystal Ann Coombs, 2003 W.C.B.J. LEXIS 2646, at *49 (2003).
64. Id. at *51.
65. Id. at *50.
66. Id. at *49.
67. Id. at *23.
68. Id. at *2.
69. Coombs, 2003 W.C.B.J. LEXIS at *18-19.
70. Id. at *19.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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diagnosis of mental disorder.74
Although the Canadian system recognizes the DSM-IV, similar
to the United States system, there is no requirement that the mother
meet any criteria for a diagnosis under the DSM-IV classification
system to use the Canadian Infanticide Act as a defense.75 A very low
threshold has been set by the Parliament for the level of mental
disturbance required to qualify for protection under the Canadian
Infanticide Act 76 and it is not necessary to establish that the mother
suffered from any form of postpartum disorder. 77 All that is required
is if at the time when a mother killed her baby, she was "not fully
recovered from the effects of giving birth to the child and by reason
thereof.., her mind was then disturbed. ' '78 There is no requirement
that the mother prove anything, and the Crown "would have to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the mother was fully recovered from
the effects of giving birth and that her mind was not disturbed by the
effects of giving birth.",79  The Coombs court opined that it is
essentially impossible for the Crown to ever prove a negative. 80 The
court sentenced Krystal Ann Coombs to "48 months imprisonment
followed by 3 years of probation." 81 Since Krystal had already served
time, she was required to "serve one day in custody plus three years
probation."
82
The construction of the Canadian Infanticide Act given by the
Coombs court and a reading of the British Infanticide Act suggests that
a mother would only qualify for protection under an Infanticide Act if
she killed her own child within the first twelve months of giving birth.
In this regard, Andrea Yates would not qualify for protection under the
Act for any of the charges of murder except the one associated with
her youngest child, Mary, who was six months old at the time of the
drownings. Furthermore, the Coombs court noted that a mother who
killed her newly adopted baby or a new mother who killed persons
other than her baby would not qualify for protection under the
Canadian Infanticide Act. 83 This holding is problematic given the
74. Id. at "21.
75. Coombs, W.C.B.J. LEXIS at *21.
76. Id. at *22.
77. Id. at *33.
78. Id.
79. Id. at *34.
80. Id.
81. Coombs, 2003 W.C.B.J. LEXIS at *57.
82. Id.
83. Id. at *20.
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recent reports of adoptive mothers suffering from postpartum
disorders.
84
B. Texas's Insanity Plea Applied to Recent Cases
1. State of Texas v. Yates
The history of the insanity defense in Texas reveals that it
followed the "irresistible impulse test" until 1983, when the Texas
legislature enacted the M'Naghten test, which includes the
requirement that the defendant suffer from a "severe" mental disease at
the time of the offense.85 The Texas Penal Code sets forth that "[i]t is
an affirmative defense to prosecution that, at the time of the conduct
charged, the actor, as a result of severe mental disease or defect, did
not know that his conduct was wrong. ' 86  This rule combines the
rigidity of the M'Naghten test, in that the actor must show that she did
not "know" the criminal act was wrong at the time of the offense,
together with the rigidity of the federal test, in that the actor must be
infirmed with a "severe" mental disease or defect.
On June 20, 2001, Andrea Yates drowned her five children in a
87bathtub. Leading up to the drownings, Andrea gave birth to her
fourth child, Luke, in February of 1999. 88 In June of 1999, Andrea
suffered severe depression and attempted to commit suicide. The
next month, Andrea was found in a bathroom holding a knife to her
neck.90 At that time, Dr. Eileen Starbranch treated Andrea and
recommended that she be admitted to a psychiatric hospital.91 While
at the hospital, Andrea told doctors that she had visions and heard
voices since the birth of her first child.92  Dr. Starbranch ranked
Andrea as one of the five sickest patients she had ever seen.93 Before
discharging Andrea, Dr. Starbranch warned Andrea and her husband,
84. See Melanie Lawrence, Beyond Baby Blues: Understanding and Coping with
Postpartum Depression, PARENT'S PRESS (2001), http://www.parentspress.com/pardepression.
html (noting that even adoptive mothers can suffer a form of PPD, one that is not
biochemically induced, perhaps caused by the high expectations associated with motherhood).
85. Tom Whatley, Reshaping the Insanity Defense, House Study Group: Special
Legislative Report 12 (Tex. House of Representatives 1984).
86. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.01 (Vernon 2005).
87. See Yates v. Texas, 171 S.W.3d 215, 218 (Tx. Ct. App. 2005).
88. Id. at 216.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 217.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Yates, 171 S.W.3d at 217.
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Russell Yates, that Andrea had a high risk of suffering another
psychotic episode if she gave birth to another baby. 94 While Andrea
was receiving treatment in the psychiatric hospital Russell purchased a
house, before the purchase of the house the Yates family had resided
in a converted bus.95 In August of 1999, they moved into the house
and Andrea began home-schooling Noah, her eldest child.96 Andrea
saw Dr. Starbranch for the last time in January of 2000 and told Dr.
Starbranch that she stopped taking her medication in November of
1999.97
In November of 2000, Andrea gave birth to her fifth child,
Mary. 98 In March of 2001, Andrea's father died and Andrea spiraled
into disfunctionality and again began to suffer from depression. 99 On
March 28, 2001, Russell called Dr. Starbranch and Dr. Starbranch
instructed him to bring Andrea in immediately, but Russell stated that
he could not bring Andrea in until the following Monday. 100 Andrea
did not make it to Dr. Starbranch's office, 1 1 and instead was admitted
to a different psychiatric hospital.1
0 2
At the new psychiatric hospital, Dr. Mohammed Saeed treated
Andrea and observed that she was catatonic and delusional. 10 3 At the
Yates' request, Andrea was discharged from this hospital on April 13,
2001, and began an outpatient treatment program. 104  Dr. Saeed
instructed that someone should stay with Andrea at all times and that
she should not be left alone with the children. 0 5 Although Russell did
not think it was unsafe to leave Andrea at home alone with the
children, when he told his mom Andrea was suffering from depression,
Russell's mom began visiting Andrea daily. 1°6 During these visits,
Andrea was observed as catatonic, unresponsive and erratic. 10 7 On
May 3, 2001, approximately a month prior to the fatal drownings,
Andrea filled a bathtub with water. When asked why she filled the
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Yates, 171 S.W.3d at 217.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Yates, 171 S.W.3d at 217.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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bathtub with water, Andrea responded, "I might need it."' 10 8
On May 4, 2001, Andrea was re-admitted to the psychiatric
hospital under Dr. Saeed's care and was prescribed Haldol.' 0 9 Andrea
was discharged on May 14, 2001, and was able to care for her
children, but was still slightly withdrawn. 110 On June 4, 2001, Dr.
Saeed began to taper Andrea off of Haldol. i"' On June 18, 2001,
Andrea denied any psychotic symptoms or suicidal thoughts and was
no longer taking Haldol. 1 2 Dr. Saeed also adjusted the dosages of her
other medications. 113  On June 20, 2001, Andrea called 911 and
reported that she needed a police officer to come to her home.1 14 The
police officers arrived within minutes and discovered four dead
children, soaking wet and covered with a sheet lying on Andrea's
bed. 1"5 The fifth child, Noah, was still in the bathtub floating face
down." 6
Andrea was charged with intentionally and knowingly causing
the deaths of Noah Yates and John Yates pursuant to the Texas Penal
Code, section 19.03(a)(7)(A), which provides that the murder of more
than one person in the same transaction is capital murder. 17 Andrea
was also charged with intentionally and knowingly causing the death
of Mary Yates, pursuant to the Texas Penal Code, section 19.03(a)(8),
which provides that murder of an individual under six years of age is
capital murder."18 At trial, Andrea pled insanity. 19
Ten psychiatrists and two psychologists testified regarding
Andrea's mental state. 120  Five of these psychiatrists and one
psychologist treated Andrea on or soon after the June 20 episode.'
2 1
Four of these five psychiatrists and the psychologist testified that on
June 20, 2001, Andrea Yates did not know right from wrong, was
incapable of knowing that what she did was wrong, or believed that
her acts were right. The fifth of these psychiatrists, Dr. Melissa
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Yates, 171 S.W.3d at 217.
112. Id. at 217-18.
113. Id. at218.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Yates, 171 S.W.3d at 216 n.1.
118. Id.
119. Id. at216.
120. Id. at 218.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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Ferguson, testified that she had not made a determination regarding
Andrea's ability to know whether her actions were right or wrong, but
noted that Andrea did make a statement to her in which Andrea stated
that drowning the children was the right thing to do.
123
One of the ten psychiatrists, the State's sole mental-health
expert, Dr. Park Dietz (who had not treated Andrea in close proximity
to the June 20 episode), testified that although psychotic on June 20,
Andrea knew what she did was wrong. 124  Dr. Dietz opined that
Andrea knew her actions were wrong because the devil told her to kill
the children, 125 and also testified that Andrea had watched an episode
of Law & Order where a mother killed her children and was found
insane due to postpartum depression. 126 It was later determined during
trial, after the jury had already returned a verdict of guilty, but prior to127
the punishment phase, that there was no such episode. Andrea's
attorneys moved for a mistrial based on the false testimony but the
court denied the motion. 
128
Andrea was found guilty of the murder charges, her insanity
plea was found to be without merit, and she was sentenced to life in
the Texas prison system. 129 Andrea filed an appeal with the Texas
Court of Appeals seeking review of the trial court's decision to deny
the motion for mistrial. 13 The Texas Court of Appeals decided that a
mistrial should have been granted. 13 1 The decision was appealed to the
Texas Criminal Court of Appeals and was upheld. 132 The Texas Court
of Appeals has recently ordered that Andrea Yates be given a new plea
deal or new trial.
133
2. State of Texas v. Laney
Meanwhile, less than a couple hundred miles away in Tyler,
Texas, and a little less than two years after the killing of the Yates
children, on May 11, 2003-the day before Mother's Day-Deanna
Laney called 911, reporting that "[she] just killed [her] boys."'' 34
123. Yates, 171 S.w.3d at 218 n.2.
124. Id. at218.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at219.
128. Id. at 220.
129. Yates, 171 S.w.3d at 216.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 222.
132. See In re Yates, 2005 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1923 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 9, 2005).
133. See id.
134. See Mother Is Held In Sons' Deaths, supra note 8.
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Deanna stoned two of her sons to death and assaulted a third son, also
by stoning. 135 The children were identified as Joshua, eight, Luke, six,
and Aaron, fourteen months.' 36 Deanna told police that God instructed
her to kill the children. 137 Reportedly, Deanna awoke at eleven p.m.
and tried to lock her husband in their bedroom as he slept. 138 Deanna
then went to bedrooms of Joshua and Luke and took the children to the
rock garden in their front yard and killed each one by striking him in
the head with a large rock. 139 Deanna also attacked the baby, Aaron,
with a rock while he lay in his crib. 140 Aaron survived the attack,
although he suffered injuries that have rendered him partially blind and
he will need special care for the rest of his life.
14 1
Deanna was charged with murder in the same manner as
Andrea Yates, 142 and Deanna pled insanity in the same manner as
Andrea Yates. The two cases shared additional similarities. Both
women gave birth to infants just months prior to the killings, both
home-schooled their children, both were devotedly religious, and the
forensic psychiatrist, Dr. Park Dietz, testified for the prosecution in
both cases. Although the facts of the two cases were very similar,
Deanna's case resulted in a different verdict.
The two cases were different in that, in addition to the experts
hired by the prosecution and the defense, the trial judge in the Laney
case called an expert to testify, Dr. William Reid. Dr. Reid testified
that Deanna was "crazy" and suffered from a severe mental disease at
the time of the killings and did not know that her actions or conduct
were wrong. 143  Three other psychiatrists declined to declare that
Deanna was insane, stating that it was a legal distinction that could
only be made by a jury. 144
The different psychiatric opinions highlight the significant
difference between the two cases and the impact of the Texas insanity
defense statute. 145 In Texas, even if a person is found to suffer from a
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See Mother Is Held In Sons' Deaths, supra note 8.
141. See John Springer, Psychiatrist: Mother Who Stoned Kids 'Crazy', COURTTV.cOM,
Apr. 2, 2004, http://www.courttv.com/trials/laney/040204 _ctv.html.
142. See Mom Who Said She Killed on God's Orders Acquitted, CNN.COM, Apr. 6, 2004,
http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/04/03/children.slain.
143. See Mother Is Held In Sons' Deaths, supra note 8.
144. See id.
145. E.G. Morris, Civil Commitment vs. Life in Prison; What Andrea Yates Knew That
Deanna Laney Didn't, TEx. LAWYER, Apr. 12, 2004, at 27.
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severe mental disease at the time of a criminal offense, the individual
has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that, at
the time of the alleged offense, the individual did not know that his or
her conduct was wrong. 146 Dr. Dietz reasoned that Yates knew her
actions were wrong and would be considered wrong by others and
God, 147 while Laney was struggling to carry out God's will. Dr. Dietz
further reasoned that Yates knew her actions were wrong because the
devil told her to kill the children, 148 while Laney did not know what
she was doing was wrong because God told her to do it.14 9 Dr. Dietz
deduced that Yates knew her actions were wrong while Laney did not.
This is the critical analysis that distinguishes Texas Insanity law-the
individual must prove she did not know her actions were wrong at the
time of the offense. Interestingly, Dr. Dietz also testified in the Jeffrey
Dahmer and John Hinckley, Jr. cases. 150
On April 6, 2004, a jury acquitted Deanna Laney of the charges
of murder, and she is currently under evaluation at a maximum-
security state psychiatric hospital, where she could remain for forty
years. 15  Deanna Laney's acquittal was due in large part to Dr.
William Reid, who specifically testified that Laney suffered from a
severe mental disease at the time of the killings and did not know that
her actions or conduct were wrong.'
52
3. The Current Status of Texas Insanity Law and Its Probable
Impact on Future Postpartum Infanticide Cases
Postpartum psychosis can cause an individual to experience a
break with reality, rendering the individual incapable of discerning
what is real from what is not.153 The question becomes whether
postpartum psychosis rises to the level of a "severe" mental disease
and, if so, whether the individual knew her actions were wrong at the
time the crime was committed.
Shortly after the Laney verdict, Lt. Gov. David Dewhurst
requested that the Texas Senate Jurisprudence Committee study the
Texas Insanity Defense laws and specifically evaluate changing the
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Yates v. Texas, 171 S.W.3d 215, 218 (Tx. Ct. App. 2005).
149. Morris, supra note 145.
150. Pam Easton, Yates to Leave Prison for Mental Hospital, U.S. NAT'L ASSOCIATED
PRESs, Dec. 20, 2005.
151. See Mom Who Said She Killed on God's Orders Acquitted, supra note 142.
152. See Mother Is Held In Sons' Deaths, supra note 8.
153. See Levy, supra note 1, at 62.
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defense of "not puilty by reason of insanity" (NGRI) to "guilty but
insane" (GBI). Some lawmakers questioned whether this change
would give more uniformity to trial verdicts. 155 In the end, however,
the Committee recommended that no change be made to the NGRI
defense. 156 While prosecutors and criminal defense lawyers agreed
that the Texas Legislature needed to fix the State's insanity defense
laws in the 2005 session, they could not agree on the best solution.
157
Reports to the Committee have recommended that an expert who will
examine individuals arguing the insanity defense must be a state-
licensed physician or psychologist with a doctoral degree and have
experience or certification in forensic psychiatry or psychology. 158 In
addition, leading legal scholars, forensic psychiatrists, and
psychologists are working on drafting a proposed amendment to the
Penal Code Section 8.01, which will read as follows:
It is an affirmative defense to prosecution that, at the
time of the conduct charged, the actor, as a result of a
severe mental disease or defect did not appreciate that
his conduct was legally or morally wrong.
The amendment will not cure the problem. Changing the
insanity defense statute is a good start for other situations, but it will
do nothing to remedy the disparate outcomes of postpartum disorder-
driven infanticide. Even under this amendment, the mother must
prove that she suffered from a postpartum disorder and that it is a
''severe" mental disease.
C. Application of the Insanity Defense Statute of Other States
1. New York
The New York Penal Code reads as follows:
In any prosecution for an offense, it is an affirmative
defense that when the defendant engaged in the
154. Mark Donald, Guilty But Insane in the Legislature, TEX. LAWYER, May 24, 2004, at
1.
155. Id.
156. The 2005 Legislative Wish List; A Preview of the Action the 79th Texas Legislature
Will See, TEX. LAWYER, Jan. 10, 2005, at 13.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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proscribed conduct, he lacked criminal responsibility by
reason of mental disease or defect. Such lack of
criminal responsibility means that at the time of such
conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, he
lacked substantial capacity to know or appreciate either:
(1) the nature and consequence of such conduct; or (2)
that such conduct was wrong.160
The test used in New York is a slight departure from the
M'Naghten test in that it departs from the rigidity of the test and takes
on the wording of the ALI test. Although the New York legislature
has not adopted an infanticide act, New York courts seem to have
more empathy and awareness of postpartum psychosis. 161 A jury in
the Supreme Court of New York acquitted Ann Green, a former
pediatric nurse, of killing her two newborn babies in 1980 and 1982,
and the attempted suffocation of her third child in 1985.162 Ann Green
raised the defense of postpartum psychosis, was found not guilty by
reason of insanity, and ordered to receive psychiatric treatment on an
outpatient basis. 63
2. Illinois
The Illinois Insanity Statute states:
A person is not criminally responsible for conduct if at
the time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease
or mental defect, he lacks substantial capacity to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct.
164
Prior to August 20, 1995, the Statute provided a defense if:
A person lacked substantial capacity either to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform
his conduct to the requirements of law. 165
160. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.15 (McKinney 2005).
161. See Ronald Sullivan, Jury Citing Mother's Condition Absolves Her in Two Babies'
Death, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1988, at 29.
162. Id.
163. Martin Berg, Postpartum Psychosis Defense Gaining, L.A. DAILY J., Oct. 7. 1988, at
5; see also Sullivan, supra note 161.
164. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/6-2(a)(West 2005).
165. Id.
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(a) The People of the State of Illinois v. Sims
Paula Sims gave birth to a baby girl, Loralei, in 1986.166
Loralei died a few weeks thereafter. 167 The pathologist reported that
Loralei died of suffocation as a result of someone placing their hands
over Loralei's nose and mouth.168  Paula stated that Loralei was
abducted by a masked intruder. 169 Loralei's remains were found in a
wooded ravine by Jersey County authorities.
In 1988, Paula gave birth to Randall, 170 and, in 1989, Paula
gave birth to another baby girl, Heather, who also mysteriously came
up missing a few weeks after her birth. 171 Again, Paula stated that
Heather was abducted by an intruder. 172 Several days later, Heather's
remains were found wrapped in a small plastic trash bag and stuffed in
a public park trash can.17 The State removed Randall from Paula and
her husband's care.174
A grand jury indicted Paula on charges of first-degree murder,
obstruction of justice, and concealment of the homicidal death of
Heather. 175 Paula was never charged with the death of Loralei. 176 The
State of Illinois sought the death penalty. 177 Paula's trial took place in
early 1990 and Paula testified. 178 The jury found Paula guilty on all
charges, and prior to sentencing, Paula admitted that she killed both
Loralei and Heather.179 Paula maintained that she drowned both of her
baby girls.' The jury deadlocked during deliberations on the issue of
capital punishment and the judge sentenced Paula to life
imprisonment. 181
While in prison, Paula began to talk to a prison psychologist
and an author about her case, and became educated on the subject of
postpartum disorders. 182 Paula petitioned the court for a new trial on
166. Illinois v. Sims, 750 N.E.2d 320, 323 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Sims, 750 N.E.2d at 323.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 324.
176. Id. at 323.
177. Id. at 324.
178. Sims, 750 N.E.2d at 324.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 325.
182. Id.
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the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel because of her attorney's
failure to raise the defense of insanity based on postpartum
depression. 183  During the hearing on Paula's motion, an assistant
appellate defender, Kathleen Hamill, testified that she was familiar
with postpartum depression-based insanity pleas and had provided
Paula's attorney with this information. 84 Ms. Hamill further testified
that she provided Paula's attorney with documentation and a list of
expert witnesses, including a letter explaining the importance that
Paula be tested immediately to determine if she possessed the
hormonal imbalances associated with postpartum disorders.' 85 The
prison psychologist, Edward Loew, also testified during the hearing
that Paula suffered from major depression. 186  In addition, a
postpartum disorder expert, Dr. Diane Sanford, testified that Paula
suffered from a postpartum disorder at the time she killed Heather.'
87
The Illinois Court of Appeals admitted that Paula's attorney
was aware of the postpartum-based insanity defense, that blood tests
would have revealed whether Paula suffered from the disorder, and
that Illinois case law held that "failure to conduct a proper examination
of medical records that would reveal evidence in support of an insanity
defense has been held to constitute constitutionally deficient legal
assistance."' 188 The court also admitted that the evidence established
that Paula most likely suffered from a postpartum disorder at the time
she killed her children.' 89  Nonetheless, the court determined that
Paula's medical records failed to reveal any indication that she
suffered from a postpartum disorder, and, as such, her legal
representation did not constitute ineffective assistance. 190
(b) The People of the State of Illinois v. Hulitta
The Sims case was decided by the Fifth District of the Illinois
Appellate Court. A full reading of the Sims decision suggests that the
Fifth District Court would have accepted the defense of insanity based
on postpartum depression if it had been timely offered. However, in
late 2005, Calandra Hulitta did not receive the same openness to such
183. Id.
184. Sims, 750 N.E.2d at 325-26.
185. Id. at 326.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 328.
189. Id. at 329.
190. Sims, 750 N.E.2d at 329-30.
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a defense from the First District of the Illinois Appellate Court. 191 The
Hulitta case is another illustration of disparate ideologies of different
courts in the same jurisdiction on the subject of postpartum disorders.
Calandra Hulitta gave birth to a newborn baby on or about July
1, 1999. She already had a daughter, Moneka, who interrupted her
efforts to sleep shortly after giving birth.1 92 Within days of giving
birth, on the morning of July 7, 1999, Calandra tied Moneka's hands
and feet together, stuffed a sock in her mouth and wrapped tape around
her mouth and neck. 193 Moneka died of suffocation. 19
4
The state of Illinois charged Calandra with two counts of first
degree murder. 195 The trial court refused to allow Calandra's expert,
Dr. Robert Smith, a psychologist, to testify that she suffered from
postpartum depression at the time of Moneka's suffocation. 196 Dr.
Smith opined that although Calandra was not legally insane at the time
of the offense, she suffered from postpartum depression that
disallowed her of the ability to appreciate the danger of her actions. 
197
The Illinois Insanity Statute was amended to do away with the
excuse for culpability that a person lacked substantial capacity to
appreciate the danger of her actions. 198  This defense represents a
diminished capacity excuse, which is not recognized in Illinois. 199 The
trial court therefore granted the State's motion to bar a diminished
capacity or postpartum depression defense and did not allow Dr.
Smith's testimony. 200 The trial court found that Calandra's postpartum
depression was not relevant to the issue of intent.2 1 The trial court
stated that expert testimony was not needed to show that Calandra was
depressed-that "anyone with any sense" could see that she was
202 203depressed. The jury found Calandra guilty of first-degree murder.
Although the State requested the death penalty, the jury sentenced
Calandra to thirty years imprisonment. 204 Calandra filed a motion for
191. Illinois v. Hulitt, 361 Ill. App. 3d 634 (2005).
192. Id. at 635.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Hulitt, 361 I1l. App. 3d at 636.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 641.
200. Id. at 637.
201. Id. at 636.
202. Id.
203. Hulitt, 361 111. App. 3d at 637.
204. Id.
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new trial that was denied.2 °5 Calandra appealed the conviction arguing
that the trial court committed error by granting the State's motion to
exclude Dr. Smith's expert testimony regarding the effect of
postpartum depression on Calandra's mental state at the time of the
offense. 2
0 6
The Court of Appeals found that Dr. Smith's testimony would
raise an "impermissible affirmative defense," and that the admissibility
of psychiatric evidence regarding a defendant's intent depends on
whether the expert testifies to scientific knowledge not within the
common knowledge of the jury. 20 7 The Illinois Court of Appeals
found that the jury was more than capable of determining, based on
their common knowledge, that Calandra was depressed at the time of
the offense and acted recklessly, rather than knowingly or
intentionally, and thus did not need the testimony of an expert.2° 8 But
is "depression" the same as "postpartum depression"-a disease that
causes hormonal imbalances and drives a mother to kill her own
children? And does a jury need an expert to explain this difference?
3. California
The California Penal Code reads as follows:
(a) The defense of diminished capacity is hereby
abolished....
(b) In any criminal proceeding, including any juvenile
court proceeding, in which a plea of not guilty by
reason of insanity is entered, this defense shall be
found by the trier of fact only when the accused
person proves by a preponderance of the evidence
that he or she was incapable of knowing or
understanding the nature and quality of his or her
act and of distinguishing right from wrong at the
time of the commission of the offense.
20 9
The California test seems to follow the M'Naghten approach, but the
individual must not know that her act was wrong at the time she
commits the act. The California test is nonetheless less rigid than the
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 638.
209. CAL. PEN. CODE § 25 (2005).
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Texas test in that the individual does not have to be found to have
suffered from a "severe" mental disease or defect.
(a) The People of the State of California v. Massip
Sheryl Lynn Massip was charged with killing her six-week old
son Michael on April 29, 1987, when she ran over him with her Volvo
station wagon.21 ° Sheryl Lynn gave birth to Michael on March 17,
2111987. Michael cried fifteen to eighteen hours a day and suffered a
great deal of pain,212 and doctors were never able to determine the
source of Michael's pain.213  During the six weeks following
Michael's birth, Sheryl Lynn could not eat or sleep and began to have
suicidal thoughts of "jumping off a building or out of a window." 214
On April 29, 1987, Sheryl Lynn took Michael for a walk.215 Sheryl
Lynn first threw Michael into the pathway of an oncoming car, that
216was able to swerve and miss Michael. Sheryl Lynn then ran over
Michael with her Volvo, and subsequently placed him in a trash ca217
Michael died as a result of the injuries inflicted by Sheryl Lynn.218
Sheryl Lynn was charged with second degree murder and
received a jury trial.219 Sheryl Lynn raised the defense of not guilty by
reason of insanity, based on postpartum psychosis. 2 20 The Orange
County jury rejected this defense, found that Sheryl Lynn was sane at
the time of the killing, and convicted her of second degree murder.221
The court, however, reduced the conviction to voluntary manslaughter,
set aside the finding of sanity, acquitted her on the grounds of
temporary insanity, and sentenced her to one year of outpatient
treatment. -22 The court found that on the day of the killing, Sheryl
Lynn's mental condition was disrupted and delusional as a result of
postpartum depression, and, at times, postpartum psychosis. 22 These
findings were significant in light of the fact that this was the first case
in California in which the postpartum psychosis defense was raised.
210. People v. Massip, 271 Cal. Rptr. 868-69 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
211. Id. at 868.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 869.
215. Id.
216. Massip, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 869, 873.
221. Id. at 869.
222. Massip, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
223. Id. at 873.
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(b) The People of the State of California v. Harris
A more recent postpartum case in California occurred on
October 19, 2005, when twenty-three year old Lashaun Harris tossed
her three young children into the San Francisco Bay.224 The children
were identified as Treyshaun, six years old, Taronta, two years old,
and Joshua, sixteen months old.225  Reportedly, Lashaun told
authorities that voices told her to throw her children into the water. 22 6
She told family members that she would feed the children "to the
sharks. 227 Lashaun was charged with three counts of murder.228
On October 21, 2005, relatives reported that Lashaun had a
history of mental illness, suffered from schizophrenia, and that she had
quit taking her medication. 229 Another family member reported that the
family "knew the girl needed help," and had tried to get her into a
mental hospital, but the hospital declined to admit Lashaun.23 °
Lashaun will undoubtedly raise the defense of postpartum psychosis,
and, if so, based on the Massip case, she may prevail. A jury would
have a difficult time finding her sane.
V. CONCLUSION
Postpartum psychosis is still not accepted as a separate form of
mental illness in the DSM-IV.23' In this regard, the DSM-IV does not
recognize postpartum disorders in a category of their own.232 Until
federal and state court systems in the United States standardize
treatment for mothers who kill their children as a result of postpartum
disorders, extremely disparate results will occur in courts in the same
jurisdiction and jurisdictions across the country. In turn, this will
create a lack of confidence in the judicial system. Irrespective of the
individual state's insanity defense statute, each state should move
toward enacting a separate infanticide statute based on the defense of
postpartum psychosis.
224. See, e.g., Mother Arrested after Tossing Kids in San Francisco Bay, FOXNEWS.COM,
Oct. 20, 2005, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,172824,00.html.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See, e.g., Mother Charged with Three Counts of Murder, CNN.COM, October 21,
2005, http://edition.cnn.com/2005fUS/10/20/children.bay/index.html/.
229. Id.
230. Mother Arrested after Tossing Kids in San Francisco Bay, supra note 224.
231. See Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, supra note 4, at 386.
232. Id.
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It is also not sensible to limit the mother to protection only if
she commits the homicidal act against her child within twelve months
of giving birth. The insanity defense should be available to a
defendant who commits a homicidal act committed against any
individual if the defendant is found to have given birth within a
twelve-month period or close to that time and that the defendant
suffered from postpartum psychosis.
The legal community will look forward to the enactment of the
American Infanticide Act, or such enactments by individual states, and
to the day when postpartum disorders are recognized in the DSM-IV
as a distinct category of mental disease characterizing postpartum
psychosis as a "severe" mental disease.
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